Suchergebnisse

Donahue, K.; Hauser, O. P.; Nowak, M. A.; Hilbe, C.: Evolving cooperation in multichannel games. Nature Communications 11, 3885 (2020)

Milutinović, B.; Stock, M.; Grasse, A. V.; Naderlinger, E.; Hilbe, C.; Cremer, S.: Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters 23 (3), S. 565 - 574 (2020)

Hilbe, C.; Hagel, K.; Milinski, M.: Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic experiment. PLoS One 11 (10), e0163867. (2016)

Hilbe, C.; Traulsen, A.; Sigmund, K.: Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Games and economic behavior 92, S. 41 - 52 (2015)

Hilbe, C.; Wu, B.; Traulsen, A.; Nowak, M. A.: Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111 (46), S. 16425 - 16430 (2014)

Schoenmakers, S.; Hilbe, C.; Blasius, B.; Traulsen, A.: Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology 356, S. 36 - 46 (2014)

Hilbe, C.; Röhl, T.; Milinski, M.: Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma. Nature Communications 5, 3976 (2014)

Hilbe, C.; Traulsen, A.; Röhl, T.; Milinski, M.: Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111 (2), S. 752 - 756 (2014)

Abou Chakra, M.; Hilbe, C.; Traulsen, A.: Plastic behaviors in hosts promote the emergence of retaliatory parasites. Scientific Reports 4, 4251 (2014)

Hilbe, C.; Nowak, M. A.; Sigmund, K.: Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 110 (17), S. 6913 - 6918 (2013)

Hilbe, C.; Abou Chakra, M.; Altrock, P. M.; Traulsen, A.: The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas. PLoS One 8 (6), e66490 (2013)

Hilbe, C.; Nowak, M. A.; Traulsen, A.: Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance. PLoS ONE 8 (11), e77886 (2013)

Hilbe, C.; Traulsen, A.: Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite. Scientific Reports 2, 458 (2012)

Schmid, L.; Hilbe, C.: Modeling the evolution of strategic ignorance. In: Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not to Know (Hg. Hertwig, R.; Engel, C.). MIT Press, Cambridge (2021)

Trimmer, P. C.; McElreath, R.; Auster, S.; Brown, G. D.A.; Dana, J.; Gigerenzer, G.; Golman, R.; Hilbe, C.; Kandler, A.; Kareev, Y. et al.; Schooler, L. J.; Szech., N.: Modeling deliberate ignorance. In: Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not to Know (Hg. Hertwig, R.; Engel, C.). MIT Press, Cambridge (2021)